

Do ***SAFETY-CRITICAL SYSTEMS*** really need to be ***STATIC ?***

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Background

Nowadays, current **complex embedded systems** are **distributed** (DES)

- ✓ Cars, planes, industrial machinery ...

There is also a trend to **increase integration** among subsystems as a way to


- ✓ **Improve efficiency** in using systems resources
- ✓ **Reduce** number of active **components** and **costs**
- ✓ **Manage complexity**

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Background

Higher integration and distribution lead to a **stronger impact of the network** on the global system properties:

- ✓ Composability, timeliness, flexibility, dependability...



We will focus on the network services

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Current approach

Safety concerns have typically led to **static** approaches in the design of DES

- ✓ Static implies we **always know** what we **should be observing** at each instant
(conflict **flexibility** versus **safety**)
- ✓ **Fault-tolerance** mechanisms become **simpler**
- ✓ Proliferation of **static Time-Triggered** architectures using **TDMA** with pre-allocated slots
(**TTP, TT-CAN, FlexRay, SAFEbus, SwiftNet**)

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However

Static approaches:

- ✓ Tend to be **inefficient** in the use of system resources → potential for higher costs
- ✓ Do not easily accomodate **changes** in the **operational environment** or **system configuration**

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Moreover

There is a growing interest in using DES
in **dynamic operational scenarios**:

- ✓ Systems with **variable number of users**, either humans or not (traffic control, radar...)
- ✓ Systems that operate in **changing physical environments** (robots, cars...)
- ✓ Systems that can **self-reconfigure dynamically** to cope with hazardous events or evolving functionality (cars, planes, ...)

QoS adaptation, graceful degradation, survivability

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Network requirement

Dynamic (flexible) management of bandwidth while guaranteeing both real-time and safety constraints.

- ✓ Act upon **periodic communication**, e.g. related to **control information** (potentially bandwidth consuming)
- ✓ **Adapt transmission rates** according to **effective needs**
- ✓ Explore subsystems that **operate occasionally**
- ✓ Explore **variable sampling/tx rates** according to the current system **control stability state**

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Problem

How to implement such level of **flexibility** without jeopardizing **timeliness** and **safety**?

Hints

- ✓ Combining **flexibility** with **timeliness** requires the use of adequate **communication paradigms and protocols**
- ✓ Combining **flexibility** with **safety** requires **constraining flexibility** and guaranteeing sufficient resources

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Flexibility and timeliness

The communication protocol must exhibit/support:

- ✓ **Bounded** communication **delays**
- ✓ On-line changes to the communication requirements → **dynamic traffic scheduling**
- ✓ On-line **admission control**
(based on appropriate schedulability analysis)

Dynamic planning-based scheduling paradigm

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Flexibility and safety

A form of constraining flexibility must be supported:

- ✓ Possible solution – **Mode change protocols**
 - ✓ set of **predefined modes**
 - ✓ on-line mode switching
 - ✓ requires **a priori definition of all** possible modes

10 subsystems with 2 states each → 2^{10} possible modes !
Each being independently verified

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Flexibility and safety

Alternatively, flexibility can also be constrained by **extending the characterization** of message streams with:

- ✓ **safety constraints**

Nominal rate, level of criticality

- ✓ **change attributes**

Permitted changes


→ **Resources are reserved** according to **safety constraints**
(one mode to verify off-line)

Online, subsystems can **use more or less resources** if they are **available** and that **change is permitted**

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Constraining Flexibility



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Architectural requirements


- ✓ Maintain a Communication Requirements Database (**CRDB**)
- ✓ Support for:
 - ✓ on-line changes to either message set as well as scheduling policy with **low latency**
 - ✓ on-line admission control and bandwidth management with **low latency**
 - ✓ **Replication**

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Possible architecture

Master-slave paradigm, for flexibility control



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
Possible architecture

Fault-tolerance features

- ✓ Detection of omissions
- ✓ Master/network replication
- ✓ Fail-silent nodes
 - ✓ System nodes:
time domain (BGs)
 - ✓ Masters:
time and value domains
(internal replication)

Coherency between databases:

- consistency in change requests
- CRDB / scheduler_state transfer
- verification of trigger schedules



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Implementation

This architecture is the basis of the
FTT (Flexible Time-Triggered) architecture

Two protocols have already been developed according to this architecture

- ✓ **FTT-CAN** and **FTT-Ethernet**
 - ✓ **Efficient master-slave implementation**
 - ✓ **Efficient combination of sync(TT)/async(ET) traffic**

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Conclusion

Concerning DES we have observed:

- ✓ Growing interest in **dynamic operational scenarios** (QoS adaptation, graceful degradation, survivability)
- ✓ This requires **flexible (dynamic) bandwidth management** (particularly wrt the periodic traffic)
 - ✓ **Increased bandwidth efficiency**
→ more functionality or better service with same bandwidth

We have shown a **possible architecture** that

- ✓ Supports such flexible management of the periodic traffic with
 - ✓ **Guaranteed timeliness**
 - ✓ **High safety level**