Intruder deductions with AC symbols.

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Outline



An approach to the analysis of cryptographic protocols.

- From protocol specification to formal models of security.
- Handling algebraic properties: Finite variant property.



- Definition.
- Examples.
- Partial results.

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From protocol specification to formal models of security. Handling algebraic properties: Finite variant property.

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Protocol specification and intruder theory.

Protocol specification: agents send and receive messages.

$$A(\overline{z}) = \lambda \overline{x} \nu \overline{N} : \begin{cases} u_1 \longrightarrow v_1 \\ u_2 \longrightarrow v_2 \\ \dots \\ u_m \longrightarrow v_m \end{cases}$$

Protocol execution: bounded number of sessions.

 $A(p,q) \mid A(q,r) \mid A(p,r) \mid B(p,q) \mid B(q,r)$

Intruder capabilities:

- Knows any message from the network.
- Knows the information of compromised agents.
- Can construct and send messages to any agent.

From protocol specification to formal models of security. Handling algebraic properties: Finite variant property.

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Intruder modelisation.

Execute the protocol: guess an interleaving of actions

$$\begin{cases} \begin{array}{cccc} u_{1} & \longrightarrow & v_{1} \\ u_{2} & \longrightarrow & v_{2} \\ & \ddots & \\ u_{n} & \longrightarrow & v_{n} \end{array} \\ \end{array}$$
Security issue: accessibility of this guess
$$\begin{cases} & T_{0} & \Vdash & u_{1} \\ & T_{0}, v_{1} & \Vdash & u_{2} \\ & & \ddots & \\ & T_{0}, v_{1}, \dots, v_{n-1} & \Vdash & u_{n} \\ & T_{0}, v_{1}, \dots, v_{n-1}, v_{n} & \Vdash & secret \end{cases}$$

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Formal model - constraint systems

Ground deducibility: $v_1, \ldots, v_n \vdash_{I,E} u$ Constraint systems: Syntax

$$C = \begin{cases} T_1 & \Vdash & u_1 \\ T_1, T_2 & \Vdash & u_2 \\ & \dots & & \\ T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n & \Vdash & u_n \end{cases}$$

Syntactic properties:

- Monotonicity: no information is lost.
- Origination: a variable first appears on the right.

Semantics: σ satisfies C in (I, E) if

$$\begin{array}{ccc} T_1 \sigma & \vdash_{I,E} & u_1 \sigma \\ T_1 \sigma, T_2 \sigma & \vdash_{I,E} & u_2 \sigma \end{array}$$

$$I_1\sigma, I_2\sigma, \ldots, I_n\sigma \vdash_{I,E} U_n\sigma$$

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From protocol specification to formal models of security. Handling algebraic properties: Finite variant property.

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Equational theories and finite variant property. H.Comon-Lundh and S.Delaune - 2005

Protocol insecurity \equiv Satisfiability of *C* in (*I*, *E*). Finite variant property: reduce *E* to *AC*.

> • $C \longrightarrow Var(C)$ • $I \longrightarrow Var(I)$ • C is satisfiable in (I, E) iff $\exists C' \in Var(C)$: C' is satisfiable in (Var(I), AC).

Relevant equational theories: AG, ACUN, Diffie-Helman, etc.

Example: AG.

$$x * (y * z) = (x * y) * z$$
 $x * x^{-1} = 1$
 $x * y = y * x$ $x * 1 = x$

Practical protocol: France Telecom.

Definition. Examples. Partial results.

Definition of the problem.

Terms. - Constants: $a_1, a_2, ..., a_n$ - *Ground terms*: $t = \sum_i \lambda_i a_i$, where $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_n \in \mathbb{N}$ - Terms with variables: $v = t + \Sigma_x \lambda_x x$. Deducibility relation for ground terms. $v_1, v_2, ..., v_n \vdash u$ if $\exists \lambda_1, ..., \lambda_n \in \mathbb{N}$: $u = \sum_i \lambda_i v_i$. Constraint systems: $\begin{cases} T_1 \Vdash u_1 \\ T_1, T_2 \Vdash u_2 \\ \dots \\ T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n \Vdash u_n \end{cases}$ Monotonicity: no information is lost. Origination: a variable first appears on the right. Question: Is there a substitution σ s.t. for any *i*: $T_1\sigma, T_2\sigma, \dots, T_i\sigma \vdash u_i\sigma?$ イロト 不得 とくほ とくほ とうほ

Examples

Example 1. $\left\{\begin{array}{rrrr} 2a \Vdash X+a\\ 2a, X+c \Vdash Y+c\\ 2a, X+c, Y \Vdash 2a+c \end{array}\right.$ Solution: X = a, Y = aExample 2. $\begin{cases} a+2b \Vdash 2X \\ a+2b, X+b \Vdash 2X+a \end{cases}$ Solution: does not exist. Example 3. $\left\{\begin{array}{rrrr} a \Vdash X \\ a, X + b \Vdash Y + b \\ a, X + b, Y + c \Vdash 2X + c \end{array}\right.$ Dependencies: $Y = X + \lambda a$, $2X = Y + \lambda' a$

An approach to the analysis of cryptographic protocols.	Definition.
Current problem.	Examples.
Future work	Partial results.
Difficulties	

Undecidability: without monotonicity.

• i.e code multiplication.

Straightforward approach: introduces non-linearities.

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$$\begin{cases} a \Vdash X \\ a, X \Vdash Y \\ \bullet \begin{cases} X = \lambda a \\ Y = \lambda' a + \lambda'' \lambda a \end{cases}$$

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An approach to the analysis of cryptographic protocols. Definition. Current problem. Examples. Future work Partial results.

Particular case - a single variable on the right.

Definition:
$$\begin{cases} T_1 \Vdash u_1 \\ T_2 \Vdash u_2 \\ \dots \\ T_n \Vdash u_n \end{cases}$$
, where $u_i = \beta_i X_i + \gamma_i$

Approach:

- Search for minimal solutions.
- Partition the set of variables into equivalence classes.
- Characterize the relation between minimal solutions of some subsystems.
- Reduce the system to a smaller one by eliminating the minimal class.

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Definition. Examples. Partial results.

Details of the proof

Useful terms: Guess $U_i \subseteq T_i$ Occurence relation: $X \prec_{occ} Y$ iff $\exists i, v$ s.t $\begin{cases} Y \in Var(u_i) \\ X \in Var(v) \\ v \in U_i \end{cases}$ Equivalence classes: $X =_{occ} Y$ iff $X \prec_{occ} Y$ and $Y \prec_{occ} X$ Goal of the following lemmas: Eliminate a minimal class of $=_{occ}$.

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Definition. Examples. Partial results

Details of the proof

Lemma 1: If $=_{occ}$ has a single equivalence class. Then $\exists C$ which bounds the λ -coefficient of every non-ground term. $\begin{cases} X_1 \prec_{occ} X_2 \prec_{occ} \ldots \prec_{occ} X_n \prec_{occ} X_1 \\ \lambda_1 X_1 + t_1 &= \beta_1 X_2 + \gamma_1 \\ \lambda_2 X_2 + t_2 &= \beta_2 X_3 + \gamma_2 \\ \ldots \\ \lambda_n X_n + t_n &= \beta_n X_1 + \gamma_n \end{cases}$ Corollary: Linear system $(X, \Lambda) = (X_0, \Lambda_0) + \Sigma c_i w_i$ Minimal class: M, S' - the subsystem determined by $M, X \in M$ $X\sigma = X\theta + \Sigma c_i w_i^X$ σ - a general solution of S' θ - a minimal solution of S' w_i - minimal solutions of S'_h イロト 不得 とくほ とくほう 二日

Definition. Examples. Partial results.

Details of the proof

Notation: *x* - the index of the constraint introducing *X*. Lemma 2: $\exists \beta$ s.t. $\beta w_i^X = \Sigma \lambda_t t$, with $t \in T_x$ and *t*-ground. Proof: $X \prec'_{occ} Y$ iff $(X \prec_{occ} Y, x < y)_{lex}$ Use induction. Lemma 3: If σ - minimal solution of S and $X \in M$ then $\exists \theta$ - a minimal solution of *S'*, $\exists w(S')$ - a vector depending only on *S'* s.t. $X\sigma \leq X\theta + w$. Proof: Use Lemma 2, origination and monotonicity.

Corollary: Eliminate *M* by solving *S'*

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Future work

- Decidability of the (general) pure AC case.
- Combination results.
- Long term goal: be able to make a program for analysing real-world protocols from a generic class (i.e. France Telecom protocol)

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