



Coral: a tool for Compositional Reliability and Availability analysis[†]

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
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[†]This research has been partially funded by
the EU under grant IST-004527 (ARTIST2)



Introduction

Science




Input/Output

Interactive


Markov

Chains

- *Precise*
- *Efficient*



Dynamic
Fault
Trees



Engineering

- *Graphical*
- *Easy to use*



But... DFT Drawbacks

- State-space explosion.
- Ambiguous syntax and semantics.
- Lack of modularity:
 - Dynamic modules can not be reused.
 - Restrictions on spares and dependencies.
- Existing analysis technique is hard to extend or modify.




Outline

- Case study: FTPP system.
- Dynamic fault trees (DFT).
- DFT semantics in terms of I/O-IMCs.
- Deep compositionality.
- Prototype tool chain.
- Conclusion.




Case study: FTTP



- 16 processors divided into 4 groups
- 4 network elements connect the processors
- Per group 2 processors must be operational
- Different configurations are possible





Case study: FTTP



- 16 processors divided into 4 groups
- 4 network elements connect the processors
- Different configurations are possible
- Dynamic redundancy management is possible



FTPP DFT





Monolithic DFT analysis [Dugan et al. 1992]

- Convert the DFT into a Continuous-time Markov chain.
- Analyze CTMC using standard solution techniques.
- In special cases binary decision diagrams can be used!





$$\Pr(A \text{ fails in } T \text{ hours}) = 1 - e^{-0.2 \cdot T}$$

$$A\text{'s Mean time to failure} = 1/0.2 = 5 \text{ hours}$$

Unreliability = Prob[Reaching  in time T]



FTPP Results




Analysis method	Max number of states	Max number of transitions	Unreliability (T=10)
Monolithic	32757	426826	$2.55479 \cdot 10^{-8}$



What's behind it?

- Model local behavior
- Combination of **I/O automata** and **CTMC**; closely related to **IMCs**
- **Markovian** transitions (CTMC)
- **Interactive** transitions
- Action signature
 - ? - Input actions
 - ! - Output actions
 - ; - Internal actions

**I/O-IMC for
Basic event**





Input/Output Interactive Markov Chains (I/O-IMC)





DFT semantics

DFT gate to I/O-IMC




Translation is scalable and reusable!





What is deep compositionality?

- Semantics of a DFT arises naturally as composition of the semantics of its building blocks



- But: This may lead to huge models.



Why use deep compositionality?


- Formally define semantics
- Many useful techniques
 - Combining models: **Composition**
 - Refining models: **Abstraction**
 - Minimizing models: **Aggregation**
 - Reusing models: **Renaming**
- Well supported by CADP toolset (VASY/INRIA)
 - Widely used in industry (e.g. Airbus)

Combat
State-space
explosion



Prototype tool chain

Coral – DFT analysis






Conclusion:

How we tackled drawbacks

- State-space explosion.
- Ambiguous syntax and semantics.
- Lack of modularity:
 - Dynamic modules can not be reused.
 - Restrictions on spares and dependencies.
- Existing analysis technique is hard to extend and/or modify.

Compositional Aggregation



Renaming!

Lifted!

Extensions at the lowest level



Future work

- Fully automated tool
- More aggressive state reduction
 - Weaker equivalences
 - Interface constraints
 - Phase-type minimization
- Further extensions to DFT modeling capabilities
 - Extension to non-exponential distributions
 - New DFT building blocks
- Apply deep compositionality to other engineering formalisms!
 - E.g. Architectural description languages like AADL




- H. Boudali, P. Crouzen, M. Stoelinga. “Dynamic Fault Tree analysis using Input/Output Interactive Markov Chains”, to appear, DSN 2007 proceedings.
- H. Boudali, P. Crouzen, M. Stoelinga. “A compositional semantics for Dynamic Fault Trees in terms of Interactive Markov Chains”, submitted to ATVA 2007.
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
The END!




Case studies



(a) The cascaded PAND system



(b) The cardiac assist system







(c) A multi-processor distributed computing system

Case study	Analysis method	Max number of states	Max number of transitions	Unreliability (T=1)
(a)	Monolithic	4113	24608	0.00135668
(a)	Compositional	132	426	0.00135668
(b)	Monolithic	8	10	0.657900
(b)	Compositional	36	119	0.657900
(c)	Monolithic	253	1383	$2.00025 \cdot 10^{-9}$
(c)	Compositional	157	756	$2.00025 \cdot 10^{-9}$



DFT semantics


DFT gate to I/O-IMC





Non-determinism!

FDEP:
*If "NE1" fails,
"A", "B" and "C"
also fail*



Who gets the spare?

