

# Modelling, Refining, and Proving with Event-B

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- General concepts and comments
- An illustrating example
- A demo with the Rodin Platform
- Slides can be distributed
- Text of example can be distributed

- Being **correct by construction**
- Some **simple ingredients**:
  1. Informal (but **precise**) Requirements
  2. **Modeling** vs. programming
  3. **Refining**
  4. **Proving**

# 1. Requirements

- Contains the **properties** of the future system
- Allowing us to **judge** eventually that the **final product is correct**
- Made of short **labeled** “fragments” (**traceability**)
- Should be **easy to read** (different font) and **easy to extract** (boxed)

1. Feasibility Study

2. Requirement Document

3. Technical Specification

4. Design

4. Coding

5. Test

6. Documentation


7. Maintenance

- Importance of this document (due to its **position** in the life cycle)
- Obtaining a **good** requirement document is **not easy**:
  - **missing** points
  - too **specific** (over-specified)
- Requirement document are usually **difficult to exploit**

- Two **separate texts** in the same document:
  - **explanatory** text: the **why**
  - **reference** text: the **what**
- **Embedding** the reference text within the explanation text
- The reference text eventually becomes the **official** document
- Must be **signed** by concerned parties

## 2. Modeling vs. Programming

- Helping **people** in doing the following **transformation**:



- It does not seem to be different from **ordinary programming**

- A formal method is a **systematic approach**
- It is used to determine whether a **program has certain properties**
- Different **kinds of formal methods** (according to this definition)
  - Type checking
  - Static analysis
  - Model checking
  - **Theorem proving**

- This is the **approach developed here**
- It concentrates on the construction of models by **refinements**
- The properties to be proved are **parts of the models**
- The **most refined model** is automatically **translated into a program**

- Some **mature** engineering disciplines:
  - Avionics,
  - Civil engineering,
  - Mechanical engineering,
  - Train systems,
  - Ship building,
  - . . .
- Are there any **equivalent approaches** to Formal Methods with Proofs?
- Yes, **BLUE PRINTS**

- Formal methods are techniques for building and studying blue prints
- These blue prints are ADAPTED TO OUR DISCIPLINE
- Our discipline is the design of hardware and software SYSTEMS
- Such blue prints are now called formal models

- Models allow to reason about a FUTURE system
- The basis is lacking (hence you cannot “execute” all models)
- Using pre-defined conventions in order to facilitate reasoning:
  - Classical Logic (Predicate Calculus)
  - Basic Set Theory (sets, relations and functions)

- These systems operate in a **discrete fashion**
- Their dynamical behavior can be **abstracted** by:
  - A succession of **steady states** (enriched by invariants)
  - Intermixed with **sudden jumps** (events)
- Usually such systems **never halt**
- They are called **DISCRETE TRANSITION SYSTEMS**

### 3. Refinement

- Refinement allows us to build models **gradually**
- We shall build an **ordered sequence** of more precise models
- A useful analogy: looking through a **microscope**
- **Spatial** as well as **temporal** extensions
- **Data** refinement

## 4. Proving

- Test reasoning (a vast majority): VERIFICATION
- Blue Print reasoning (a very few): CORRECT CONSTRUCTION

- Based on laboratory execution
- Obvious incompleteness
- The oracle is usually missing
- Properties to be checked are chosen a posteriori
- Re-adapting and re-shaping after testing
- Reveals an immature technology

- Based on a **formal model**: the “blue print”
- **Gradually** describing the system with the **needed precision**
- **Relevant Properties** are chosen **a priori**
- Serious thinking made **on the model**, not on the final system
- **Reasoning is validated by proofs**
- Reveals a **mature technology**

- The proof **succeeds**
- The proof fails but **refutes the statement to prove**
  - the model is **erroneous**: it has to be modified
- The proof **fails but is probably provable**
  - the model is **badly structured**: it has to be reorganized
- The proof **fails and is probably not provable nor refutable**
  - the model is **too poor**: it has to be enriched

## An Illustrating Example

- Illustrating the previous points:
  1. Informal (but **precise**) Requirements
  2. **Modeling**
  3. **Refining**
  4. **Proving**

- We want to build a **business protocol**
- A seller **S** wants to **order a product** from a warehouse clerk **C**.
- The seller **may reserve some products** before making a **final choice**
- S and C communicate by means of **messages**

This protocol involves a **seller S** and a **warehouse** with **products**

ENV-1

S may **reserve** products (one at a time)

FUN-1

S may **delete** the reservation of products (one at a time)

FUN-2

**At the end, S may order one of the reserved products**

FUN-3

The protocol also involves a **warehouse clerk C**

ENV-2

S and C communicate by means of **messages**

ENV-3

**S** can **make a reservation** by sending a **message** to **C**.

FUN-4

**C** always **confirms a reservation** by sending a **message** to **S**.

FUN-5

S can delete a reserved product by sending a message to C.

FUN-6

S can order a reserved product by sending a message to C.

FUN-7

Order, deletion or reservation messages cannot be sent by S  
between a reservation message and its confirmation.

FUN-8

The ordered product must be the same for both partners

FUN-9

Messages can be reordered before being treated by C

ENV-4

Messages are never lost

ENV-5

At the end, all pending messages must be treated by C

ENV-6

1. Formalising the overall purpose of the protocol: FUN-3
2. The Seller **S is alone** in the Warehouse: FUN-1 and FUN-2
3. **Introducing** the Warehouse Clerk **C**: other requirements
4. Technical refinement (to make things **implementable**)

- We just formalise what the seller can eventually do: **order a product**.
- First, we define a carrier set ***PRD***: the product information.

**sets:** *PRD*

- A single variable ***S\_ORD*** denoting the **set of ordered product**.

**variables:** *S\_ORD*

- *S\_ORD* is at most a **singleton set**

**inv0\_1:**  $S\_ORD \subseteq PRD$

**inv0\_2:**  $S\_ORD \neq \emptyset \Rightarrow \exists x \cdot S\_ORD = \{x\}$

- The **INIT event** making  $S\_ORD$  empty at the beginning
- The **Order event** making  $S\_ORD$  a singleton set

**INIT**

$S\_ORD := \emptyset$

**Order**

**any**  $p$  **where**

$p \in PRD$

$S\_ORD = \emptyset$

**then**

$S\_ORD := \{p\}$

**end**

At the end, S may order one of the reserved products


FUN-3

- We define two more **variables**:
- **$S\_USD$**  is the set of **used products** (already reserved in the past)
- **$S\_RES$**  is the set of **reserved products** (candidates for ordering)

**inv1\_1:**  $S\_USD \subseteq PRD$

**inv1\_2:**  $S\_RES \subseteq S\_USD$

**inv1\_3:**  $S\_ORD \subseteq S\_RES$



**TRUE** means protocol active

**FALSE** means protocol terminated

**Initially:** The protocol is made **active** and **no** products are **used**, **reserved**, or **ordered**

**Reserve:** When protocol is active, choose a **new product** (not used) and make it **used** and **reserved**

**Delete:** When protocol is active, choose a **reserved product** and make it **not reserved**

**Order:** When protocol is active, choose a **reserved product** and make it **ordered**. Make protocol **inactive**

INIT

$S\_USD := \emptyset$

$S\_RES := \emptyset$

$S\_ORD := \emptyset$

Order

**any**  $p$  **where**

$p \in S\_RES$

$S\_ORD = \emptyset$

**then**

$S\_ORD := \{p\}$

**end**

- The protocol is **active** while *S\_ORD* is empty

Reserve

**any**  $p$  **where**

$p \notin S\_USD$

*S\_ORD* =  $\emptyset$

**then**

$S\_USD := S\_USD \cup \{p\}$

$S\_RES := S\_RES \cup \{p\}$

**end**

Delete

**any**  $p$  **where**

$p \in S\_RES$

*S\_ORD* =  $\emptyset$

**then**

$S\_RES := S\_RES \setminus \{p\}$

**end**

- Invariant preservation by the events requires 7 proofs
- All proved automatically by the prover of the Rodin Platform.

## - Event Reserve

During the protocol, S may reserve a product	FUN-1
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## - Event Delete

During the protocol, S may delete the reservation of a product	FUN-2
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## - Event Order


At the end of the protocol, S may order a reserved product	FUN-3
--	-------

- Adding *C* variables:

*C\_USD*, *C\_RES*, and *C\_ORD*

- Adding *channel* variables:

*res\_chn*, *cfm\_chn*, *del\_chn*, and *ord\_chn*



**inv2\_1:**  $C\_USD \subseteq PRD$

**inv2\_2:**  $C\_RES \subseteq C\_USD$


**inv2\_3:**  $C\_ORD \subseteq C\_RES$

- Connecting S and C variables

$$\text{inv2\_4: } S\_USD = C\_USD \cup res\_chn$$

$$\text{inv2\_5: } C\_USD \cap res\_chn = \emptyset$$

- $C\_USD$  and  $res\_chn$  **partition**  $S\_USD$



- We have similar connections for other channels

$$\text{inv2\_6: } S\_RES \cup del\_chn = C\_RES \cup res\_chn$$

$$\text{inv2\_7: } S\_RES \cap del\_chn = \emptyset$$

$$\text{inv2\_8: } S\_ORD = C\_ORD \cup ord\_chn$$

$$\text{inv2\_9: } C\_ORD \cap ord\_chn = \emptyset$$

```
snd_Reserve
  refines
    Reserve
  any p where
     $p \notin S\_USD$ 
     $S\_ORD = \emptyset$ 
     $res\_chn = \emptyset$ 
     $cfm\_chn = \emptyset$ 
  then
     $S\_USD := S\_USD \cup \{p\}$ 
     $S\_RES := S\_RES \cup \{p\}$ 
     $res\_chn := \{p\}$ 
  end
```

```
snd_Delete
  refines
    Delete
  any p where
     $p \in S\_RES$ 
     $S\_ORD = \emptyset$ 
     $res\_chn = \emptyset$ 
     $cfm\_chn = \emptyset$ 
  then
     $S\_RES := S\_RES \setminus \{p\}$ 
     $del\_chn := del\_chn \cup \{p\}$ 
  end
```

```
snd_Order
  refines
    Order
  any p where
     $p \in S\_RES$ 
     $S\_ORD = \emptyset$ 
     $res\_chn = \emptyset$ 
     $cfm\_chn = \emptyset$ 
  then
     $S\_ORD := \{p\}$ 
     $ord\_chn := \{p\}$ 
  end
```

```
rcv_Confirm
  when
     $cfm\_chn \neq \emptyset$ 
  then
     $cfm\_chn := \emptyset$ 
  end
```

```
rcv_Reserve
  when
     $res\_chn \neq \emptyset$ 
  then
     $C\_USD := C\_USD \cup res\_chn$ 
     $C\_RES := C\_RES \cup res\_chn$ 
     $cfm\_chn := res\_chn$ 
     $res\_chn := \emptyset$ 
  end
```

```
rcv_Delete
  any  $p$  where
     $p \in del\_chn$ 
  then
     $C\_RES := C\_RES \setminus \{p\}$ 
     $del\_chn := del\_chn \setminus \{p\}$ 
  end
```

```
rcv_Order
  when
     $ord\_chn \neq \emptyset$ 
  then
     $C\_ORD := ord\_chn$ 
     $ord\_chn := \emptyset$ 
  end
```

(1) We cannot prove that the event **rcv\_Delete**

```
rcv_Delete
  any  $p$  where
     $p \in del\_chn$ 
  then
     $C\_RES := C\_RES \setminus \{p\}$ 
     $del\_chn := del\_chn \setminus \{p\}$ 
  end
```

preserves invariant **inv2\_6**:

**inv2\_6:**  $S\_RES \cup del\_chn = C\_RES \cup res\_chn$

- We have to introduce the following new invariant:

**inv2\_11:**  $res\_chn \cap del\_chn = \emptyset$

(2) Then we cannot prove that the event **rcv\_Order** preserves invariant **inv2\_3**

```
rcv_Order
  when
     $ord\_chn \neq \emptyset$ 
  then
     $C\_ORD := ord\_chn$ 
     $ord\_chn := \emptyset$ 
  end
```

**inv2\_3:**  $C\_ORD \subseteq C\_RES$

- This amounts to proving:

$ord\_chn \subseteq C\_RES$

- We, simply add this statement as a new invariant:

**inv2\_12:**  $ord\_chn \subseteq C\_RES$

S can make a reservation by sending a message to C.

FUN-4

```
snd_Reserve
  refines
    Reserve
  any p where
     $p \notin S\_USD$ 
     $S\_ORD = \emptyset$ 
    res_chn =  $\emptyset$ 
    cfm_chn =  $\emptyset$ 
  then
     $S\_USD := S\_USD \cup \{p\}$ 
     $S\_RES := S\_RES \cup \{p\}$ 
    res_chn :=  $\{p\}$ 
  end
```

C always confirms a reservation by sending a message to S.

FUN-5

```
rcv_Reserve
  when
     $res\_chn \neq \emptyset$ 
  then
     $C\_USD := C\_USD \cup res\_chn$ 
     $C\_RES := C\_RES \cup res\_chn$ 
     $cfm\_chn := res\_chn$ 
     $res\_chn := \emptyset$ 
  end
```

S can delete a reserved product by sending a message to C.

FUN-6

```
snd_Delete
  refines
    Delete
  any  $p$  where
     $p \in S\_RES$ 
     $S\_ORD = \emptyset$ 
     $res\_chn = \emptyset$ 
     $cfm\_chn = \emptyset$ 
  then
     $S\_RES := S\_RES \setminus \{p\}$ 
     $del\_chn := del\_chn \cup \{p\}$ 
  end
```

S can order a reserved product by sending a message to C.

FUN-7

```
snd_Order
  refines
    Order
  any p where
     $p \in S\_RES$ 
     $S\_ORD = \emptyset$ 
     $res\_chn = \emptyset$ 
     $cfm\_chn = \emptyset$ 
  then
     $S\_ORD := \{p\}$ 
     $ord\_chn := \{p\}$ 
  end
```

Order, deletion or reservation messages cannot be sent by S  
between a reservation message and its confirmation.

FUN-8

The **ordered product** must be the **same** for both partners

FUN-9

- This is achieved thanks to the following theorem:

**thm2\_2:**  $ord\_chn = \emptyset \Rightarrow S\_ORD = C\_ORD$

- Requirements
- Refinement strategy
- Successive refined models:
  - constants
  - variables
  - invariants
  - events
  - proofs
  - requirements meeting

- I shortly presented a practice of **formal modeling**
- It is done with an approach called **Event B**
- *Modeling in Event-B: System and Software Engineering*  
by J-R. Abrial. Cambridge University Press (2010)
- It is developed within some European Projects: **Rodin** and **Deploy**
- **Loading** the free software of the **Rodin Platform**: <http://event-b.org>
- An illustrating **demo**